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Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co.,
49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
For generations, thousands of workers have suffered injuries
while operating industrial machinery. Since the advent of products
liability, most courts have imposed the costs of these injuries on
manufacturers who fail to design machines which are free of
defects.' Under traditional modes of analysis, whether liability can
be imposed is often contingent upon whether the product was in a
defective condition at the time it left the manufacturer's hands. 2 A
question remains, however, as to the extent of a manufacturer's liabil3
ity for injuries incurred as a result of a foreseeable modification.

A majority of state courts have explicitly adopted or generally followed the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS approach which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any

contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1963-1964). See, e.g., Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 551 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd, 568 S.W.2d 648 (1977); Levea v. G.A. Gray Corp.,
17 Wash. App. 214, 562 P.2d 1276 (Ct. App. 1977). But see Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 388, 348 N.E.2d 571, 579, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976).
Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1963-1964):
g. Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller
is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent
mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the
hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can
be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
id.

d Accord, RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment p (1963-1964):

Further processing or substantial change.

Thus far the decisions applying the rule
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The New York Court of Appeals, in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 4 held that as a matter of law a manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from an employer's modification of a manufacturer's safety device."
As of 1964 plaintiff's employer, Plastic Jewel, had purchased
three plastic injection molding machines from defendant manufacturer, Reed-Prentice.' Because of its peculiar production needs,
Plastic Jewel, upon delivery of the machines, was forced to cut a six
by fourteen inch hole in the center of each of the safety gates. 7

stated have not gone beyond products which are sold in the condition, or in substantially the same condition, in which they are expected to reach the hands of the
ultimate user or consumer. In the absence of decisions providing a clue to the rules
which are likely to develop, the Institute has refrained from taking any position as
to the possible liability of the seller where the product is expected to, and does,
undergo further processing or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and
before it reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer.
.. . The question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery
and prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is
to make the changes. No doubt there will be some situations, and some defects, as
to which the responsibility will be shifted, and others in which it will not. The
existing decisions as yet throw no light upon the questions, and the Institute therefore expresses neither approval nor disapproval of the seller's strict liability in such
a case.
id.
49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
The majority concluded
[t]hat a manufacturer of a product may not be cast in damages, either on a
strict products liability or negligence cause of action, where, after the product
leaves the possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a subsequent modification which substantially alters the product and is the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries.
Id. at 475, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
6 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 9, Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach.
Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Plaintiff-Respondent].
' 49 N.Y.2d at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719. The machines were designed
to manufacture plastic beads. Plastic was melted inside a heating chamber and then forced into
a molding area where it was molded under 275 tons of pressure into the shape of a bead. The
mold consisted of two rectangular platens, one of which remained stationary while the other
opened and closed on the melted plastic. After the beads were formed, the moving platen
returned to its original position and the operator was able to manually remove the finished
product from the molding area. Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
In order to protect the operator of the machine from the molding area, the machines were
equipped with acrylic safety gates which covered the molding area while the machine was
operating. Only when the molding cycle was completed could the operator open the safety gate
and thereby gain access to the platens in order to remove the finished product. Id. at 476-77,
403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
Ninety-nine percent of Plastic Jewel's business, however, was molding plastic beads directly onto a nylon cord, 20 to 200 feet long. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 3. The cord was
stored in spools at the back of the machine and fed into the mold area where the beads were
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Representatives of Reed-Prentice later visited the employer's plant
and observed the apertures in the safety gates. Despite Plastic
Jewel's requests, however, Reed-Prentice refused to design a
machine which would comport with the employer's production requirements while at the same time maintaining safety mechanisms. 8
In 1965, after Reed-Prentice's representatives had visited the
plant, Plastic Jewel purchased a fourth machine.' Upon delivery, the
employer cut a hole in the center of the safety gate just as it had
done with the other machines.'
Six and a half years later, plaintiff,
Gerald Robinson, was hired by Plastic Jewel to operate the fourth
machine. During his first month on the job, seventeen year old
Robinson suffered severe injuries when his hand slipped through the
hole in the safety gate and was caught between the molds of the
machine. 1
Robinson filed suit against Reed-Prentice, who thereafter impleaded third party defendant, Plastic Jewel. Plaintiff alleged strict
liability in that the safety gate was improperly designed for the
machine's intended purpose. Plaintiff further alleged negligence in
that Reed-Prentice had foreseeable knowledge that the machine
would be used in an unreasonably dangerous manner inasmuch as

formed around it. At the end of each molding cycle, the beads were removed and the cord was
reset for the next cycle. In order to mold the beads on a continuous line, Plastic Jewel cut a
hole in the safety gate, thus enabling the operator to pull the beads through the opening and
reset the cord for the next cycle without cutting the string. 49 N.Y.2d at 477, 403 N.E.2d at
442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719. This alteration destroyed the functional utility of the safety gate by
"permitt[ing] access into the molding area while the interlocking circuits were completed."
Id.
at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Although never addressed in either the majority or dissenting opinions, it can reasonably
be presumed from the discussions of the employer's peculiar needs that the guards were generally fit for a bead manufacturer's purposes. Cf. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152,
161, 166, 386 A.2d 816, 820, 822 (1978) (guard had to be removed periodically in order to clean
machine or dislodge objects).
49 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Although the majority refers to Plastic Jewel's past use of "two identical machines," id. at
477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719, the dissent maintained that the 1965 transaction
was the fourth such purchase from Reed-Prentice. Id. at 482, 403 N.E.2d at 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d
at 722 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 482, 403 N.E.2d at 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). While
the dissent relied on the fact that this was the fourth machine purchased and that Reed-Prentice
was on notice of the employer's alterations, id., the majority paid it little credence, only mentioning that "[tihe record containe[d] evidence that Reed-Prentice knew, or should have known,
the particular safety gate design for the machine made it impossible to manufacture beads on
strings." Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
"i Id. at 475-76, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718. Before coming to New York,
Robinson lived in a small town near Charleston, South Carolina where he had completed only
nine years of school and had been working in tobacco fields. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 6.
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Reed-Prentice knew that Plastic Jewel was compelled to cut a hole in
the safety gate in order to meet its production requirements."2 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Robinson, assessing forty percent
liability against manufacturer Reed-Prentice and sixty percent against
Robinson's employer, Plastic Jewel. 13 The appellate division found
the verdict excessive and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages
unless plaintiff agreed to stipulate to a reduced judgment." Plaintiff
consented to a reduction of damages, the jury verdict was amended,
and the judgment affirmed."5 The New York Court of Appeals reversed.
The court, adopting a traditional view, found that the manufacturer was not liable under either a theory of negligence or strict
liability where an employer's substantial alteration of the product was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.6 Writing for the
majority, Chief Judge Cooke discussed a manufacturer's potential
liability under a theory of negligence. He explained that although a
manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in designing a
machine which is safe for both its intended use and its reasonably
foreseeable unintended use, that duty is not "open-ended." The court
stated that a manufacturer need not "trace the product through every
link in the chain of distribution to insure that users will not adapt the
product to suit their own unique purposes.""1 Foreshadowing its
analysis as to strict liability, the majority determined that a manufacturer's duty extends to the design of a product which is safe at the

12 The plaintiff also pleaded two other causes of action: (1) breach of an implied warranty of
fitness for use; (2) breach of an express warranty. Brief of Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party
Plaintiff at 3-4, Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980). At the close of the trial, the court dismissed the two warranty causes of
action, and submitted the case to the jury under theories of negligence and strict liability. Id. at
4.
'3 49 N.Y.2d at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718. On March 9, 1978,
the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Gerald Robinson in the amount of $1,250,000.00. Id.
'" Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 67 A.D.2d 893, 413 N.Y.S.2d 698
(App. Div. 1979) (mem.), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
11Plaintiff stipulated to a judgment of $600,000.00. Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Brief
in Support of Motion of Defendant-Appellant, Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., For
Leave to Appeal at 15-17, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
16 The majority reasoned that the manufacturer was not liable where a purchaser deliberately "destroy(ed] the functional utility of the safety gate. Principles of foreseeability [were
deemed] . .. inapposite where a third party affirmatively abuse[d] a product by consciously
bypassing built-in safety features." 49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
See also note 5 supra.
17 49 N.Y.2d at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d
at 721.
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time of sale. Consequently, substantial alterations of a product, regardless of foreseeability, were characterized as "not within the ambit
of a manufacturer's responsibility.""s The court posited that expansion of a manufacturer's duty to include an employer's substantial alteration of a product "would be tantamount to imposing absolute
liability on manufacturers for all product-related injuries."'9
Thereafter the court considered the manufacturer's proposed
liability under a theory of strict liability. Chief Judge Cooke rejected
plaintiff's contention that the "machine was improperly designed for
its intended purpose." 2 Defining a defectively designed product as
one which "presents an unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding
that it was meticulously made according to . . . specifications," the
court declared that the defect must exist at the time the product
leaves the manufacturer's hand." According to this definition, the
machine in question was not defectively designed. The court noted
that at the time the machine left the manufacturer's hands it was
equipped with a safety gate which was in compliance with New York
State safety regulations. In addition, the court reasoned that but for
the employer's alteration the safety gate "would have rendered . . .
[the] accident an impossibility." 22 Thus the majority perceived that
plaintiff was not predicating his strict liability claim on the defective
design of the product, but rather on the fact that it was foreseeable
due to the defendant's actual knowledge that Plastic Jewel would destroy the functional utility of the safety mechanism. The court concluded that, regardless of foreseeability, a manufacturer cannot be
held strictly liable for harm resulting from an employer's willful modification of a product. 23
The dissent, written by Judge Fuchsberg, argued that liability
grounded in negligence could reasonably be circumscribed within the

18 Id. at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.

11 Id. See generally Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. RBE. 1531 (1973).
1 See 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
21 Id. The court was cognizant of the fact that no product can be 100 percent accident proof.
Therefore, the court invoked the traditional test which "involves a balancing of the likelihood of
harm against the burden of taking precaution against that harm." Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
The court acknowledged that a worthy plaintiff may be denied recovery due to "the exclusivity of workers' compensation" but nonetheless refused to give the courts "license to thrust
upon a third-party manufacturer a duty to insure that its product will not be abused or that its
safety features will be callously altered by a purchaser." Id. at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 721-22 (citation omitted).
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ambit of foreseeability, especially where, as in Robinson, "the manufacturer not only could have foreseen the misuse of its product but
actually knew of its occurrence." 2" Judge Fuchsberg asserted that
there existed two possible theories of negligence under which the
jury could have found Reed-Prentice liable: negligent entrustment2
and negligent breach of a duty to warn.' Negligent entrustment was
described as "plac[ing] in another's hand an instrumentality capable
of doing serious harm if misused while knowing or having strong
reason to believe that it will be misused to the detriment of
others." 27 By emphasizing the particular facts of the case, the dissent
had no difficulty in finding that Reed-Prentice negligently entrusted
the fourth machine to Plastic Jewel. According to the dissent, the
facts were adequate to put Reed-Prentice on notice of the misuse of
the previously sold machines. 2' Based on the evidence, ReedPrentice knew or should have known that in their altered state the
machines created a potential danger. Moreover, it was clearly foreseeable that the fourth machine would also be modified thereby

24 Id. at 486, 403 N.E.2d at 448, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The
dissent recognized the majority's fear that a manufacturer's duty cannot be so broad as to obligate a manufacturer to design a product which cannot be abused. However, Judge Fuchsberg
was of the opinion that the facts would limit any such broad expansion of duty. Liability in this
case could be based on the foreseeability and actual knowledge of the misuse on the part of the
defendant.
25 The Restatement gives the most succinct explanation of negligent entrustment.
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk
of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in
or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to
them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1963-1964).
1 See note 31 infra.
27 49 N.Y.2d at 484, 403 N.E.2d at 446, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
The dissent employed the classic example of negligent entrustment wherein a defendant gives a
loaded gun to a young child who then negligently injures a third party. Id. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, Comment e E, Illustration 11 (1966); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 28.2, at 1539 (1956). E.g., Hogan v. Comac Sales, 245 App. Div. 216, 281 N.Y.S.
207 (1935), affd, 271 N.Y. 562, 2 N.E.2d 695 (1936) (automobile owner liable for endangering
security of others by permitting automobile to be driven by one with limited control of vehicle).
Reed-Prentice had visited Plastic Jewel's plant on several occasions and had observed that
at least two of its machines had been altered. There was also evidence that Plastic Jewel asked
Reed-Prentice to change the design of the machine so as to comport with its production needs.
In addition, expert testimony suggested two alternative modifications, both of which would have
prevented plaintiff's injuries and would have cost under $500.00. 49 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 403
N.E.2d at 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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creating the same foreseeable threat of injury and thus satisfying the
requirements of negligent entrustment.9
The dissent also characterized Reed-Prentice as "negligent in
failing to warn foreseeable users . . . of the danger posed by the
aperture in the safety gate." 30 Citing the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the dissent compared Reed-Prentice's duty to warn Robinson
with the duty imposed on lenders of chattels to provide expected
users with information necessary to apprise them of the potential danger of those chattels. 3' Since Reed-Prentice was aware of both the
danger posed by the previously modified machines and the continued
necessity for cutting a hole in the safety gate, it was illogical not to
impose upon Reed-Prentice a duty to warn ultimate users of the
machine."2 Furthermore, the dissent maintained that Reed-Prentice
could not assume that the potential danger would be appreciated by
inexperienced employees;33 nor could Reed-Prentice rely on Plastic

Id. at 484, 403 N.E.2d at 446, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 484, 403 N.E.2d at 446, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
A manufacturer may be held liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in warning users
of a dangerous condition. In Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976),
the court determined that:
[t]he care to be exercised in discharging the duty to warn is therefore measured by
the dangerous potentialities of the commodity as well as the foreseeable use to
which it might be put . . . [so] that the ultimate user might be sufficiently
appraised of the possible consequences.
Id. at 179.
31 49 N.Y.2d at 484, 403 N.E.2d at 446, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
30

Specifically, Judge Fuchsberg quoted the following passage from

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 388, Comment b (1963-1964):
[O]ne who supplies a chattel for another to use for any purpose is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to give to those
whom he may expect to use the chattel any information as to the character and
condition of the chattel which he possesses, and which he should recognize as
neCessary to enable them to realize the danger of using it.
Id.
Giving the purchaser the information or warnings necessary for the safe use of a product is
not always sufficient to relieve a manufacturer of liability. "The question remains whether [the]
method gives reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends
upon their having it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, Comment n (1963-1964). See
also Shell Oil Co. v. Gutirrez, 581 P.2d 271, 278-80 (Ct. App. 1978) (scope of supplier's duty
to warn determined in light of foreseeable risk of injury); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-am Agriculture Prods., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct. App. 1975) (public policy requires that
manufacturer not avoid liability by asserting lack of direct contact with user).
49 N.Y.2d at 485, 403 N.E.2d at 447, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
I Id. It is reasonable to conclude that an ultimate user, who like Gerald Robinson was
unappreciative of risk, probably thought "that the mere presence of a safety gate," provided
adequate protection. Id. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 185-89, 386
A.2d 816, 832-34 (1978), overruled in part on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
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Jewel to convey adequate warnings to its employees inasmuch as it
was obvious from Reed-Prentice's knowledge of Plastic Jewel's manufacturing procedures that Plastic Jewel chose "expediency over
safety." '
As Judge Fuchsberg concluded, "it would have been pure
pollyanna to presume that the necessary safety information would filter down to those who had to work on the machine."
The dissenting opinion left open the question whether strict
liability was a proper basis for recovery under the circumstances presented in Robinson. In a footnote, however, the dissent suggested
that strict liability might well be imposed where a manufacturer had
actual notice that a product was being used in a particular fashion and
yet failed to take appropriate safety precautions.'
Although negligence is a frequently litigated theory of products37
liability there are varying interpretations of a manufacturer's duty.
The Robinson decision presents opposing viewpoints of a manufacturer's liability for the negligent distribution of industrial machinery.

49 N.Y.2d at 485, 403 N.E.2d at 447, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).

Id.

I

Id. at 483 n.1, 403 N.E.2d at 445 n.1, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722 n.1 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Implicit in the dissent was criticism of the majority's failure "to carry the promise of
Codling and Micallef to its logical fruition." Id. at 481-82, 403 N.E.2d at 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d at
722 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
In Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 39 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1976), the
New York Court of Appeals departed from its former patent danger rule. Chief Judge Cooke,
writing for the court, reasoned that even though a danger is patent, as opposed to latent, the
manufacturer stands in a superior position for purposes of recognizing and curing defects in a
product. Id. at 386, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 39 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
' The classic statement of the necessity of finding a breach of duty in order to establish
negligence was made by Justice Cardozo. Speaking for the majority in Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), he stated that there is no negligence unless there
is a legal duty. Furthermore, this duty must be one which is owed to the plaintiff. Id. at
341-42, 162 N.E. at 99-100. In this landmark decision, justice Andrews, dissenting, defined
negligence "as an act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of others, or
which unreasonably fails to protect oneself from the dangers resulting from such acts." Id. at
348, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
The concept of duty was further expounded upon by Judge Learned Hand who outlined three
variables for determining duty: (1) probability (2) gravity of resulting injury (3) burden of adequate precautions. Thus, liability would depend on these factors. United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Prosser's definition of duty is the one most widely adhered to by the judiciary. The court in
Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 19 Ariz. App. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ct. App. 1978) "define[d] duty as
a relationship under which one party has an obligation to conform to a standard of conduct in
order to avoid injuring another." 581 P.2d at 278 (quoting W. PRossER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971)). A Michigan court, in Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240
N.W.2d 217 (1979), stated that "'duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to
which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another.' " 240 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 53 (4th ed. 1971)).
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The majority mistakenly concluded that a manufacturer's duty was
not tempered by principles of foreseeability "where a third party
affirmatively abuse[d] a product." As illustrated by the dissent,
however, a manufacturer does have a duty to guard against negligent
entrustment and to provide adequate warnings, regardless of the
effect of a third party's intervention upon a plaintiff's recovery under
a theory of design negligence." s Moreover, it is questionable
whether the majority was correct in its assertion that the machine
was "marketed in a condition safe for the purposes for which it .. .
could reasonably [have been] intended " " since Reed-Prentice had
actual knowledge of Plastic Jewel's practice and since a reasonable
manufacturer under the circumstances would have foreseen that Plastic Jewel would modify the machine in order to suit its production
needs.'4
It is relatively clear as a result of the decision in Robinson that
the New York courts would rule in favor of a manufacturer in a products liability action involving a product which is dangerous by virtue
of a third party's misuse. Perhaps the more interesting question is
whether other jurisdictions would impose liability under these circumstances, and if so, under what theory. The Michigan Court of
Appeals, when faced with an analogous situation held that a defendant may be liable under a theory of negligent entrustment. In
Fredericks v. General Motors Corp.,4' an employee of a Michigan
company injured his hand while operating an unguarded power press.
Plaintiff brought suit against the owner of a dieset which had been
supplied to plaintiff's employer for use on the press machine. 2 The
court held that the allegation that defendant supplied plaintiff's employer with diesets for use in an unguarded press machine presented
a perfect example of . . . negligent entrustment. "4 The majority,
The precise nature of the duty varies with the cause of action alleged. In an action for
design negligence, for example, the question is whether the product was in a safe condition at
the time it left the manufacturer's hands. Where a failure to warn is alleged, the question
becomes whether the manufacturer has provided an adequate warning. With regard to negligent entrustment the question is whether the manufacturer supplied a product knowing that it
would be used in a dangerous manner.
' Compare 49 N.Y.2d at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22 with id. at
483-86, 403 N.E.2d at 445-47, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 723-25.
It should be noted that the dissent, although it did not specifically address the issue, was
not necessarily disagreeing with the majority with respect to the role of foreseeability insofar as
design negligence is concerned.
- Id. at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
' See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
,"48 Mich. App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1973).
- Id. at 582, 211 N.W.2d at 45.
4 Id. at 584, 211 N.W.2d at 45.
The advantage of seeking recovery under the doctrine of negligent entrustment is that a
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couching the issue in terms of whether the manufacturer had a duty
to prescribe the method in which its product could be used, reasoned
that the defendant could " 'not assume that human beings will conduct themselves properly if the facts which are known . . . should
make him realize they are unlikely to do so.' ""
The New Jersey courts have also confronted similar factual issues
involving the problems of foreseeability and safety precautions. Plaintiffs in both Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.45 and Finnegan v.
Havir Manufacturing Corp.4 maintained a cause of action for design
negligence against Havir for injuries sustained when their hands were
caught in punch presses marketed without safety guards. In each instance the New Jersey supreme court held that the machines were
unreasonably dangerous. 7 More importantly, the cases established
the proposition that where a manufacturer expects a purchaser to install necessary safety devices, the manufacturer has breached its duty
of care by creating an unreasonable risk of harm. 4 "The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed demands more from
the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such a critical phase of
his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate
purchaser." 4' The New Jersey court reasoned that since it was foreseeable that an employer would not install safety devices, the manufacturer failed to meet the appropriate standard of care. ° Although
Bexiga and Finnegan involved machines marketed without safety
guards, rather than machines on which the guards were subsequently
altered, both illustrate the role that foreseeability plays in a negligence analysis. Where a manufacturer has actual knowledge that its

plaintiff is not required to prove that the product was defective; as noted by the court in
Fredricks, the crucial factor is the defendant's knowledge. Id. at 585, 211 N.W.2d at 45-46.
4 Id. at 584, 211 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 390, Comment
b (1963-1964)).
-' 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
- 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972).
4' Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 409, 290 A.2d at 284; Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 421, 290 A.2d at 291.
1 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 167-68, 406 A.2d 140, 148
(1979).
49 Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285; Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423, 290 A.2d at 292.
'0 How far must a manufacturer foresee? As was explained in Robinson, a manufacturer of
screwdrivers could readily foresee that its product would be used to pry open the lid of a can.
Thus, the design of the screwdriver should compensate for foreseeable uses. On the other hand,
if a purchaser were to insert a screwdriver into an electric socket, for example, the manufacturer would not be expected to foresee the use and provide protection against electrocution. See
49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721. In general, a supplier should
evaluate the environment in which its product will be used, as well as foreseeable ways its
product will be misused. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A
Primer, 2 HOFsTA L. REV. 521, 538 (1974).
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machine will be used in an unreasonably unsafe manner and fails to
take alternative safety precautions liability should attach.
Defendants in negligence actions typically assert that their acts
or omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
The majority in Robinson held that there was no negligence in light
of Plastic Jewel's intentional intervening act. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts indicates that intentional intervening acts are usually superceding forces which absolve the defendant."' What the
majority failed to consider is that this rule is qualified in a situation
where the negligent actor "should have realized the likelihood that
such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort." 52 Foreseeability is
the key factor in determining whether an intervening force was the
proximate cause of an injury.53 A foreseeable intervening cause is
one which a reasonably prudent manufacturer would anticipate under
the circumstances. The rationale for imposing liability is that
"[floreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original
As stated by
risk and hence [part] of the defendant's negligence."
the New Jersey supreme court in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering
Co.," "manufacturers cannot escape liability on grounds of misuse or
abnormal use if the actual use proximate to the injury was objectively
foreseeable." A manufacturer like Reed-Prentice, who knowingly designs a product that does not meet the production requirements of its
customer has created a risk which includes the foreseeable intervention of the purchaser's misuse and hence should be liable for injuries
proximately caused by the misuse.5

51 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 448 (1966).

52 Id.

" The courts have not thoroughly analyzed the interaction between foreseeability and proximate cause. See Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturer's Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. REV.
755, 759-60 (1977).
' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 273 (4th ed. 1971).
76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled in part on other grounds, Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
In Cepeda, a safety device that would have prevented injuries was included in the design
of a pelletizing machine. Before plaintiff arrived at work on the day of his accident, the safety
guard was removed by the employer in order to clean the machine. Plaintiff sought recovery
under a theory that the machine was defectively designed from a safety standpoint in that it was
necessary to remove the guard frequently in the normal course of operations. It could therefore
have been expected that on occasion the guard would not be replaced before resumption of
operations, whether through inadvertence or otherwise. The defendant manufacturer, it was
contended, should have equipped the machine with an interlock mechanism which would have
automatically prevented the operation of the machine unless the guard was in place. 76 N.J. at
161, 386 A.2d at 820.
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tion of the purchaser's misuse and hence should be liable for injuries
proximately caused by the misuse.6
The Robinson case is also representative of the extent of New
York's committment to a narrow interpretation of the doctrine of
strict liability. It appears, in light of the majority's opinion, that New
York's strict liability test for product defectiveness is unduly restrictive. Cognizant of the uncompromising attitude regarding the
doctrine of strict liability, the Robinson dissent reverted to a conventional analysis of negligence theory in order to illustrate ReedPrentice's culpability." 7
The New York Court of Appeals could have found Reed-Prentice
strictly liable by finding that the machine was defective when it left
the defendant's control. 58 In testing for defectiveness, one must
analyze the design alternatives available to a manufacturer at the time
of the product's distribution. 5' Expert testimony revealed that
alternative designs were available, at a minimal cost, at the time
Reed-Prentice sold the machine to Plastic Jewel."0 As discussed
above, Reed-Prentice was aware of the employer's production requirements and the necessity for cutting a hole in the safety gate in
order for the employer to meet its demands.6" Despite options as to
possible safety devices and a working knowledge of Plastic Jewel's
operations, Reed-Prentice delivered a machine that was improperly

76 N.J. at 177, 386 A.2d at 828.
Essentially, the majority in Robinson held that misuse of the plastic injection molding
machine was the intervening, superceding cause of the accident; hence, it was the employer's
modification of the safety gate which was the proximate cause of Robinson's injuries. For further
discussion of this area, see Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 I11.
App. 3d 974, 382
N.E.2d 36 (App. Ct. 1978) and Temple v. Wean United States, 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d
267 (1977).
The dissent in Robinson found that the intervening cause was foreseeable. Thus, the manufacturer breached its duty of care by not guarding against probable misuse. This negligence was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 49 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 403 N.E.2d at 445-46, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 722-23 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). See also Rheingold, supra note 50, at 540.
, See notes 24-35 supra and accompanying text.
"The issue is whether the product was in that condition when it left the defendant, or was
so potentially in that condition that he is responsible for it." Wade, supra note 53, at 758.
Defect is a broad concept, and the question should be whether the product was unreasonably
unsafe. This requires a balancing of the cost of accident prevention against the risk. See Micallef
v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 131 (1976).
9 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 172, 406 A.2d 140, 151
(1979).
- 49 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 403 N.E.2d at 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
See also note 28 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
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designed, that is, one not reasonably safe for Plastic Jewel's intended
purpose.62
Of final concern is the analysis of third party intervention and
strict liability. Faced with an employer's intervention, the majority in
Robinson refused to hold Reed-Prentice liable, regardless of foreseeability, on the ground that the product was not defectively designed when it left the control of the manufacturer.'
In the past,
many jurisdictions were inclined to defeat strict liability claims when
confronted with a third party's intervening act.6' The doctrine, as set
forth in Section 402A of the Restatement, does not specifically provide for the proximate cause issue raised by a third party's substantial
alteration of a product. The courts have disagreed as to the relationship between foreseeability and proximate cause.' As with negligence, the question in cases involving strict liability should be
whether the third party's use or misuse was foreseeable. The better
view, and the one adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Package Machinery Co.,' is that a manufacturer has a
duty to guard against foreseeable danger. Plaintiff in Thompson sustained injuries when a molding press machine she was operating

' The California courts stress that a product is defectively designed under a strict liability
theory if it does not function as could be expected when put to its intended or reasonably
foreseeable uses. In Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443
(1978), the court offered two alternative tests for determining design defectiveness.
(1) if the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, [or]
(2) if plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury
and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance,
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.
Id. at 432, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38, 573 P.2d at 455.
11Id. at 479-80, 403 N.E.2d at 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720-21.
SWade, supra note 53, at 760. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., 541 F.2d 343 (3d Cir.
1975) (manufacturer not liable where an employer changed original starting device of machine)
(Pennsylvania law); Keet v. Service Mach. Co., 472 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972) (defect which
develops when employer removes part of a punch press machine not attributable to manufacturer) (Ohio law); Hardy v. Hull Corp., 446 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1971) (manufacturer not liable where
employer's subsequent modifications of mold press rendered machine dangerous since product
was not sold in defective condition) (Arizona law).
' Wade, supra note 53, at 760. In strict liability cases, the courts have expanded the concept of intended use "to something like normal use, then perhaps to something like expected
use, and then . .. to include a foreseeable use." Id.
The doctrine of strict liability encountered further difficulty in that there was considerable
uncertainty as to what constituted an improperly designed product. As a result, many plaintiffs
resorted to a theory of design negligence in order to avoid the burden of proving that the defect
existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's hands. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 42 TENN. L. REV. 11, 80-83 (1974).
' 22 Cal. App.3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Ct. App. 1971).
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closed on her hand. Defendant manufacturer sought to escape liability on the ground that the plaintiff had intentionally bypassed the
machine's safety mechanisms in order to speed up the production
process.67 Despite the alleged misuse of the machine, the court held
that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable "where the alteration
of the machine or its misuse by the customer was reasonably
foreseeable."
The majority in Robinson was overly concerned with
the possibility that to hold a manufacturer strictly liable where a purchaser intentionally destroyed a safety device would be tantamount to
making the manufacturer an insurer of all product related injuries. As
evidenced by Thompson, however, liability under these circumstances can be appropriately limited by foreseeability.
In furtherance of public interest, it is normally the supplier who
is said to stand in a superior position with regard to its products and
who should be required to recognize and cure defects-including the
likelihood of foreseeably dangerous modifications.69 Imposing legal
responsibility upon the manufacturer for foreseeable third party alterations would reduce the possibility of industrial accidents such as
Gerald Robinson's. A manufacturer's conduct in knowingly placing or
leaving a product on the market in a condition not suited for its intended purpose should result in liability.70 Unfortunately, the court
of appeals in Robinson erred in choosing to overlook the key factor of
foreseeability. Consequently, New York remains notably "a step behind the rest" in the development of products liability.7'
Donna J. Baboulis

67 id. at 190-91, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83. Defendant further contended that the machine, if
dangerous at all, was so only by virtue of the employee's alteration or misuse of the safety
features. id.
6 Id. at 196, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 286. For further discussion of the relationship between the
doctrine of strict liability and the concept of foreseeability, see Polelle, The ForeseeabilityConcept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 101
(1976).
69 See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 121-22 (1976).
70 In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the New
Jersey supreme court, in discussing the modem view, noted that "the product must be designed safely with an eye not simply toward use in the jobs for which it was built but for each
and every use which is reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 190, 406 A.2d at 160 (Clifford, J., dissenting). See also Noel, supra note 57, at 64. ("courts are inclined to ... leave the foreseeability of the intervening careless handling to the jury, particularly where a serious danger arises if
there is any improper handling of the product.").
71 See generally Twerski, From Codling to Bohm to Velez: Triptych of Confusion, 2 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 489 (1974).

